95463230cb
Account webhooks sign outgoing payloads with HMAC-SHA256, but agent bot and API inbox webhooks were delivered unsigned. This PR adds the same signing to both. Each model gets a dedicated `secret` column rather than reusing the agent bot's `access_token` (for API auth back into Chatwoot) or the API inbox's `hmac_token` (for inbound contact identity verification). These serve different trust boundaries and shouldn't be coupled — rotating a signing secret shouldn't invalidate API access or contact verification. The existing `Webhooks::Trigger` already signs when a secret is present, so the backend change is just passing `secret:` through to the jobs. Shared token logic is extracted into a `WebhookSecretable` concern included by `Webhook`, `AgentBot`, and `Channel::Api`. The frontend reuses the existing `AccessToken` component for secret display. Secrets are admin-only and excluded from enterprise audit logs. ### How to test Point an agent bot or API inbox webhook URL at a request inspector. Send a message and verify `X-Chatwoot-Signature` and `X-Chatwoot-Timestamp` headers are present. Reset the secret from settings and confirm subsequent deliveries use the new value. --------- Co-authored-by: Sojan Jose <sojan@pepalo.com> |
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| .. | ||
| api.rb | ||
| email.rb | ||
| facebook_page.rb | ||
| instagram.rb | ||
| line.rb | ||
| sms.rb | ||
| telegram.rb | ||
| tiktok.rb | ||
| twilio_sms.rb | ||
| twitter_profile.rb | ||
| web_widget.rb | ||
| whatsapp.rb | ||